IR Seminar- Bann-Seng TanAuthor: CASE
Location: CASE 288
FACULTY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES AND ECONOMICS
Name: Bann-Seng Tan- Bošaziçi University
Title: Liberalization at the Margins
Date: May 2,2017 -Tuesday
Place: CAS 288
Abstract: Under what conditions can aid donors nudge recalcitrant recipients towards democracy? Since political liberalization is costly for recipients, they can be expected to resist pressure for political reforms. States with the strategic or economic attributes that match the donors’ non-democratization priorities are in a position to trade concessions in exchange for aid and in lieu of democratization. Conversely, states that do not have the strategic or economic attributes that donors value but still need aid should have a harder time resisting pressure to reform politically. Hence, these “secondary” recipients are more likely to liberalize. The evidence based on foreign aid data and regime type estimates bare out the argument even after correcting for the threat of reverse causality.
Short Bio: Bann Seng Tan is an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Bošaziçi University. He teaches on International Relations. He does research on foreign aid, democratization and international security. He is currently working on a book project on foreign aid and democracy promotion.