IR Seminar-Merih Angưn

Author: CASE
Time: 17:00
Location: CASE 127


Name: Merih Angưn -  Blavatnik School of Government University of Oxford

Title: Political Principals and Bureaucratic Agents: A Two-Level Model of International Monetary Fund Program Design

Date:  February 15, 2018 –THURSDAY

Place: CASE 127

Time: 17:00 -18:30

Abstract: What factors influence the number and scope of conditionality of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program? And how do those factors play into shaping the design of the programs? This research analyzes the variations in IMF conditionality through building a new analytical framework. I present a “Two-Level Principal-Agent Model” of IMF lending with hypotheses that are tested using a single-country study involving the four IMF programs implemented in Turkey between 1994 and 2008. The main findings of this study provide supporting evidence for the strong influence of economic bureaucracy in the design of conditionality in IMF programs. The validity of the causal mechanisms involved, i.e. antinomic delegation, power of economic bureaucracy and bargaining power of the recipient country, which I demonstrate through process tracing on the Turkish case, is strengthened by a computational simulation of negotiations over conditionality during program. I therefore show that a fragmented political system, severe economic crisis and discontent of the Executive Board regarding the IMF staff’s program design cause more conditionality. The findings and mixed-methods of this study pave the way for enhanced analysis of decision-making processes in international organizations, particularly for cases involving delegation of authority within multiple sides of negotiations, as in the case of IMF lending.